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Illinois v. Lafayette: Has the Fourth Amendment
Vanished in the Face of Administrative
Expediency?
INTRODUCTION
A fundamental purpose of the fourth amendment is to safeguard
the individual from unreasonable governmental invasions of legiti-
mate privacy expectations.' Consequently, the general rule is that
warrantless searches are unreasonable per se.2 One of the "few and
carefully drawn exceptions ' 3 to the general rule has been the inven-
tory search.4 This exception to the warrant requirement was estab-
lished in the landmark case of South Dakota v. Opperman.5
Opperman, however, left open the important question whether it is
"reasonable" to open a closed container during the course of an
inventory search. This question was answered affirmatively by the
Supreme Court in Illinois v. Lafayette.6 Unfortunately, in deciding
this issue, the Court has raised a more critical question: Will all
government intrusions made under the aegis of standard inventory
procedures automatically outweigh an individual's expectation of
privacy?
This Note will examine the Court's decision in Illinois v. Lafay-
ette 7 to determine whether the Court has expanded the scope of its
holding in South Dakota v. Opperman8 to a degree not contem-
plated by the Opperman majority. First, a brief discussion of the
1. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. The full text of the Fourth Amendment reads as
follows:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and ef-
fects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no
Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirma-
tion, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or
things to be seized.
2. United States v. Katz, 389 U.S. 347, 367 (1967).
3. United States v. Jones, 357 U.S. 493, 499 (1958).
4. An inventory search is a noninvestigatory search for the purpose of protecting
the individual's possessions while he is in jail. See infra notes 64-67 and accompanying
text. For an in depth discussion of inventory searches, see generally Comment, The
Inventory Search of An Offender Arrested for a Minor Traffic Violation: Its Scope and
Constitutional Requirements, 53 B.U.L. REv. 858 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Comment,
The Inventory Search]; Stroud, The Inventory Search and the Fourth Amendment, 4
IND. L.F. 471 (1971).
5. South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364 (1976). See infra notes 9-18 and
accompanying text.
6. Illinois v. Lafayette, 103 S. Ct. 2605 (1983).
7. Id.
8. Opperman, 428 U.S. at 364.
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Opperman decision will provide a background on the establishment
of the inventory search exception. This will be followed by a review
of a number of federal court decisions made prior to Lafayette.
Then the precedents relied upon by the Court in Lafayette will be
discussed to determine whether their factual dissimilarities make
questionable the underpinnings of the Court's decision. Addition-
ally, there will be a review of some state court decisions which are
in conflict with the holding in Lafayette. Finally, this Note will
conclude with some suggested alternatives to the inventory proce-
dures sanctioned by the Lafayette Court.
I. BACKGROUND
A. The Inventory Search Exception to the Warrant Requirement
The landmark case of South Dakota v. Opperman9 established the
inventory search exception to the warrant requirement.10 In Opper-
man, the defendant's car had been impounded for multiple parking
violations. Following standard procedures, the police inventoried
the contents of the car, including the contents of the unlocked glove
compartment. The Supreme Court upheld the search.1  The Op-
perman Court prefaced its discussion by noting the "traditional...
distinctions between automobiles and homes or offices in relation to
the fourth amendment."' 2 The Court then stated three distinct
objectives underlying the inventory procedure: first, the protection
of the owner's property while it remains in police custody; second,
the protection of the police against claims or disputes over lost or
stolen property; and third, the protection of police from potential
danger. 13 While the Opperman Court upheld the inventory search
of the glove compartment as reasonable, it did not authorize the
inspection of any closed container which might be found in the car
during the course of a search. 14
9. Id.
10. Opperman, 428 U.S. at 376.
11. Id. The Court concluded: that in following standard police procedures, pre-
vailing throughout the country and approved by the overwhelming majority of courts,
the conduct of the police was not "unreasonable" under the Fourth Amendment.
12. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, at 367-68. The Opperman court noted: "One has a
lesser expectation of privacy in a motor vehicle because its function is transportation
and it seldom serves as one's residence or as the repository of personal effects .... "
Id. at 368. The Court pointed out that automobiles, unlike homes, are subjected to
pervasive, continuing governmental regulation and control and the public nature of the
automobile as reasons for this diminished expectation of privacy. Id. at 368. In a foot-
note, Justice Powell pointed out that the "difference turns primarily on the mobility of
the automobile and the impracticability of obtaining a warrant in many circumstances.
428 U.S. 364, 382 n.9 (1976) (citations omitted).
13. Opperman, 428 U.S. at 369.
14. Id. at 380 n.7.
Mr. Justice Powell observes. . . that the police would not be justified in sift-
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A bare majority found this caretaking measure to be constitution-
ally reasonable. However, Justice Powell who provided the fifth
and deciding vote, noted in his concurring opinion that the Opper-
man rule "provided no general license for the police to examine all
the contents of such automobiles." 15 In a dissenting opinion joined
by Justices Brennan and Stewart, Justice Marshall found that the
majority failed to reconcile "the owner's constitutionally protected
privacy interest against governmental interests furthered by secur-
ing the car and its contents."1 6 Notwithstanding the dissenters' dis-
satisfaction with the balancing of the interests, there were numerous
factual exigencies which allowed the majority to justify the inven-
tory of the contents of the automobile.1 7
B. Federal Court Decisions Prior to Lafayette
Because the decision in South Dakota v. Opperman18 did not
clearly define the limits of an inventory search, a number of federal
courts of appeal relied on the holdings in United States v. Chad-
wick 19 and Arkansas v. Sanders20 to determine the permissible
scope of such searches.
In Chadwick, federal agents in Boston acting on a tip, arrested
the respondents who were suspected of drug trafficking. A double-
ing through papers secured under the procedure employed here. I agree with
this, and note that the Court's opinion does not authorize the inspection of
suitcases, boxes, or other containers which might themselves be sealed, re-
moved, and secured without further intrusion.
Id. at 388 n.6 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
15. Id. at 380 (Powell, J., concurring).
16. Id. at 384 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice Marshall criticized the three objec-
tives of the search enumerated by the majority as being insufficient, either individually
or collectively. He found two of the three objectives to be irrelevant to the facts of the
case, observing that the record of the case indicated that the police were "gratuitous
depositors" and were explicitly absolved from any obligation to inventory objects other
than those in plain view and to simply lock the car. He found unpersuasive the safety
argument for inventorying the car, since the "undifferentiated possibility of harm" was
not a sufficient basis for its inventory. Id. at 389-91. Justice Powell observed that the
efficacy of inventory searches as a means of discouraging false claims was not clear since
a claim could still be made that an item was intentionally omitted from the police
records. Id. at 378-79 (Powell, J., concurring).
17. In Opperman the automobile had been legally impounded, the impound lot was
not secure, the visible valuables on the dashboard of the automobile prompted the in-
ventory for safekeeping rather than investigatory purposes, and the owner was not
available to make other arrangements. See generally Opperman, 428 U.S. 364. Of note
is that the Court in Illinois v. Lafayette referred to the car in Opperman as "an aban-
doned automobile" although it appears that the car was impounded on the same day
that it had been cited for the parking violation. Illinois v. Lafayette, 103 S. Ct. 2605,
2610. This may be indicative of the Lafayette Court's need to justify its expansion of
Opperman, since abandonment would connote a voluntary relinquishment of both the
property and any expectation of privacy in the contents of the car.
18. 428 U.S. 364 (1976).
19. United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1 (1977).
20. Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753 (1979).
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locked footlocker had been placed in the trunk of a car, but before
the trunk was closed or the engine started the respondents were ar-
rested. The footlocker was seized and taken to the federal building
where it remained under the exclusive control of the agents. More
than an hour after the agents had taken control of the trunk, it was
searched without a warrant or the consent of the respondent. The
Court found that a person has a reasonable expectation of privacy
in personal luggage and refused to accept the government's argu-
ment that the search was "incident to arrest" or justified by any
other exigency.21
Similarly, in Arkansas v. Sanders,22 police acting on a tip, re-
moved the respondent's suitcase from the trunk of a taxi and
opened it without a warrant or consent. 23 The warrantless search
was held to be violative of the fourth amendment. 24 In a concurring
opinion, Chief Justice Burger stated: "The essence of our holding in
Chadwick is that there is a legitimate expectation of privacy in the
contents of a trunk or suitcase accompanying or being carried by a
person; that expectation of privacy is not diminished simply because
the owner's arrest occurs in a public place."2' The expectation of
privacy established by these two cases was balanced against the gov-
ernment interest furthered by the intrusion of the particular search
involved by a number of federal courts of appeal.
In one such case, United States v. Schleis,2 6 the police had forced
open the defendant's briefcase at the police station. "The briefcase
21. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 13-15. The Chadwick Court also stated in footnote:
Unlike the searches of the person, United States v. Robinson . . . United
States v. Edwards, . . . searches of the possessions within an arrestee's imme-
diate control cannot be justified by any reduced expectations of privacy caused
by the arrest. Respondents' privacy interest in the contents of the footlocker
was not eliminated simply because they were under arrest.
Id. at 16 n. 10 (citations omitted). It appears that this language does not apply to the
facts of Illinois v. Lafayette although it is hard to see why an arrestee at a police station
should have less of an expectation of privacy in his personal effects. The only explana-
tion is that the fourth amendment does not apply when an administrative search of a
noninvestigatory nature is involved.
22. Sanders, 442 U.S. at 755. In Sanders, police acting on a tip, observed the re-
spondent arrive at an airport and retrieve a suitcase, suspected of containing drugs. The
respondent's companion placed the unlocked suitcase in the trunk of a taxi and they
departed. The police followed briefly, and then stopped the taxi. They asked the taxi
driver to open the trunk and then, without asking the respondent or his companion for
permission, opened the unlocked suitcase. Pointing to the similarity of the facts to
those in Chadwick, the Court held: "[tihat the warrant requirement of the fourth
amendment applies to personal luggage taken from an automobile to the same degree it
applies to luggage in other locations." Id. at 766. The question arises: Why doesn't the
warrant requirement apply to luggage or personal effects in the possession of an
arrestee?
23. Sanders, 442 U.S. at 755.
24. Id. at 766.
25. Id. at 767 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
26. United States v. Schleis, 582 F.2d 1166 (8th Cir. 1978).
1984]
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was locked by a combination lock. No warrant was sought or ob-
tained authorizing the search of the briefcase, nor was Schleis's per-
mission asked. An evidence locker was available at the station
house but was not used for the briefcase."'27 Relying on Chadwick,
the court refused to "extend" the Opperman rationale beyond the
scope intended by the Court decision. 28 The Eighth Circuit went on
to state: "Moreover, the valid governmental interest served by an
inventory search could have been satisfied here by inventorying the
locked briefcase as a unit."'2 9 The court apparently reasoned that
this would protect the individual's expectation of privacy while si-
multaneously effectuating the legitimate governmental interest
involved.
Additionally, in United States v. Bloomfield,30 the Eighth Circuit
found that the governmental interest in opening an item which can
easily be inventoried as a unit, is "slight" in comparison with the
individual's right of privacy. 31 In Bloomfield, the defendant's knap-
sack was taken from his car during the course of an inventory
search. Though confining its holding to the facts, and even though
the inventory of the car was valid, the court stated that the knap-
sack should have been inventoried as a unit rather than opened and
itemized.32
The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia refused to up-
hold the search of a defendant's belongings in United States v. Ly-
ons.33 When the defendant was arrested in his hotel room, the
police impounded his belongings, including a coat hanging in the
closet. Refusing to sustain the search of the defendant's coat as
either incident to arrest or as an inventory search, the court said of
the "inventory search":
Though the Supreme Court has not specifically so held, it seems
indisputable that such a serious invasion of a citizen's expecta-
tion of privacy must be governed by the strictures of the fourth
amendment; the fact that the intrusion was not motivated by a
desire to unearth evidence of criminality does not render the
27. Id. at 1169.
28. Id. at 1173.
29. Id.
30. United States v. Bloomfield, 594 F.2d 1200 (8th Cir. 1979).
31. Id. at 1203.
32. Id. The Bloomfield court found that the first two commonly avowed purposes
of an inventory search "protection of the owner's property while it remains in police
custody . . .[and] the protection of the police against claims or disputes over lost or
stolen property" were better served if the knapsack was inventoried as a unit. It also
found that any threat of danger could be easily detected by the use of a device such as
dogs trained to locate explosives. Id. at 1202-03.
33. United States v. Lyons, 706 F.2d 321 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
[Vol. 21
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Constitution inapplicable.34
A similar concern with the individual's expectation of privacy
was addressed by the Ninth Circuit. In United States v. Monclavo-
Cruz,35 the defendant's purse was searched at the police station an
hour after her arrest. Relying on Chadwick to clarify the reach of
the Opperman exception, the court stated: "The search of Mon-
clavo-Cruz's purse at the station house an hour after her arrest does
not qualify as an inventory search. We have already held that Mon-
clavo-Cruz's expectation of privacy in her purse is one that society
recognizes as reasonable."'3 6 The court held "that the community
caretaking functions of the police are usually well served by simply
inventorying personal baggage as a unit without searching it.
' '37
The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals also looked to the Chadwick
Rule and balanced the individual's right to privacy against the gov-
ernment's need to intrude. In United States v. Calandrella38 the de-
fendant's briefcase was taken from him during his arrest. Though
refusing to apply Chadwick retroactively, the court stated: "Chad-
wick established a limit on the validity of warrantless searches of
property of an arrested person."' 39 Even when dealing with prop-
erty seized incident to an arrest, the legitimate expectations of an
individual need not be sacrificed to further government interests.
As pointed out by the court: "[t]he interests sought to be protected
by permitting warrantless searches incident to arrest were fully vin-
dicated by the seizure of the briefcase at the time of the arrest.
4°
These courts attempted to balance the competing interests in-
volved in each case. The Court in Illinois v. Lafayette41 acknowl-
edged that in order to determine the reasonableness of a search, the
promotion of legitimate governmental interests must be balanced
against the intrusion upon the individual's fourth amendment
rights.42 Whether the Lafayette Court did so is questionable.
II. ILLINOIS V. LAFAYETTE
A. The Facts
Following an argument with a movie theater manager, the de-
fendant was arrested for disturbing the peace and taken to the po-
34. Id. at 331 (footnote omitted) (quoting South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S.
364 (1976)).
35. 662 F.2d 1285, 1289 (1981).
36. Id. at 1289 (citations omitted).
37. Id.
38. United States v. Calandrella, 605 F.2d 236 (6th Cir. 1979).
39. Id. at 248.
40. Id. at 249.
41. 103 S. Ct. 2605 (1983).
42. Id. at 2608.
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lice station.4 3 An inventory search was conducted at the police
station, during the post-arrest booking procedure. The defendant's
shoulder bag was opened by an officer and the contents were re-
moved.44 Among the contents of his shoulder bag, was a cigarette
package which contained amphetamines.45 Consequently, the de-
fendant was charged with violating the Illinois Controlled Sub-
stance Act.4 6
Upon motion, the trial court suppressed the evidence obtained
during the warrantless search of the defendant's bag.47 An unani-
mous appellate court affirmed the granting of the motion to sup-
press, holding that the inventory of the defendant's belongings
violated the fourth amendment.4 8 When the Illinois Supreme Court
denied discretionary review49 the United States Supreme Court
granted certiorari. 50 Relying primarily on South Dakota v. Opper-
man5l and Cady v. Dumbrowski,52 the Court held "[t]hat it is not
unreasonable for police, as part of a routine procedure incident to
incarcerating an arrested person, to search any container or article
in his possession, in accordance with established inventory proce-
dures."'53 It is the reliance upon these precedents which makes the
rationale of the Court in Lafayette questionable.
B. Analysis of the Holding
The Court relied on South Dakota v. Opperman54 and Cady v.
Dumbrowski.5 5 In Cady, the search involved was not an inventory
search pursuant to standard procedures. Rather, it was a warrant-
less "caretaking search" for the purpose of locating a revolver, be-
lieved by police to be in the trunk of a car, which had not been
43. Id. at 2605.
44. Lafayette, 99 Ill. App. 3d 830, 425 N.E.2d 1383 (Ct. App. 1981). The record is
unclear whether the police removed the bag from the respondent's shoulder or if he
placed it on the counter at the police station. Id. at 832, 425 N.E.2d at 1384.
45. Id. at 832, 425 N.E.2d at 1384.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 833, 425 N.E.2d at 1384.
49. Lafayette, 103 S. Ct. 2605, 2608 (1983).
50. Illinois v. Lafayette, 103 S. Ct. 339 (1982). The Court granted certiorari "be-
cause of the frequency with which this question [whether, consistent with the fourth
amendment, it is reasonable for police to search the personal effects of a person under
lawful arrest as part of the routine administrative procedure at a police stationhouse
incident to booking and jailing the suspect] confronts police and courts .. Id. at
2608.
51. 428 U.S. 364 (1976).
52. 413 U.S. 433 (1976).
53. Lafayette, 103 S. Ct. at 2611.
54. 428 U.S. at 364.
55. 413 U.S. at 433.
[Vol. 21
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lawfully impounded. 56 In Cady, which was also a five to four deci-
sion, the Court concluded that the protection of the public out-
weighed the intrusion upon the defendant's privacy resulting from
the warrantless search of his automobile. 57
In both Cady, where the defendant was in a coma 58 at the time of
the search, and Opperman, where the defendant was also unavaila-
ble,59 the Court evaluated the reasonableness of the searches upon
the facts and circumstances of the individual cases.60 However, un-
like the facts in Lafayette, both of these cases involved the search of
automobiles, and automobiles have traditionally been exempted
from the warrant requirement. 61 The Lafayette Court's expansion
of Opperman to a post-arrest search of a person's effects, has re-
duced the expectation of privacy in those personal effects, to the
lesser level of privacy that is afforded an automobile which has been
lawfully impounded.
The Lafayette Court also discussed United States v. Robinson62
and United States v. Edwards,63 although neither of these cases in-
volved inventory searches. An inventory search of an arrestee's be-
longings prior to his incarceration is generally referred to as a
booking search. 64 The searches in Robinson and Edwards were
56. In Cady, the respondent was involved in a one car collision and arrested for
drunken driving. At the direction of the police his car was towed from the scene of the
accident. The police did not have actual custody of the car. The respondent, an off-
duty policeman was believed to have been carrying a revolver. It was not found on his
person or uncovered during the initial search of his car at the scene of the accident. In a
five to four decision, the Court upheld the action of the police in returning to the car at
the private garage and searching it without a warrant. The Court reasoned that the
protection of the public from the possibility that the suspected gun would fall into the
hands of vandals, made the search reasonable within the meaning of the fourth amend-
ment. Id. at 444-48. The dissent discussed all of the exceptions to the warrant require-
ment and found no valid exception existed to justify the search of the car an hour after
it was taken to the private garage. Id. at 450-54. The application of Cady by the Lafay-
ette court seems misplaced, since the imminent danger of a suspected revolver is far
from comparable to the search of a bag not believed to contain anything dangerous.
57. Cady, 413 U.S. at 448.
58. Id. at 436.
59. Opperman, 428 U.S. 365-66.
60. In Cooper v. California, 386 U.S. 58 (1967), the Court stated: "we made it
clear in Preston that whether a search and seizure is unreasonable within the meaning of
the fourth amendment depends upon the facts and circumstances of each case." Id. at
59.
61. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
62. United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973).
63. United States v. Edwards, 415 U.S. 800 (1974).
64. 2 W. LAFAVE, SEARCH & SEIZURE, A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMEND-
MENT § 5.3, at 306 (1978) [hereinafter cited as LAFAvE]. Professor LaFave suggests
that the "Robinson-Edwards Rule" would allow a court to justify a preincarceration
inventory search upon the additional ground that it is a search incident to arrest. Id. at
309. LaFaves's contention is unlikely in the instant case because the search incident to
arrest is not a benign, noninvestigatory search but a search for weapons or evidence of a
crime. The Illinois Appellate Court, in People v. Lafayette, ruled that the search would
8
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searches incident to arrest. The Lafayette Court acknowledged that
the factors justifying a search incident to arrest are different from
those justifying a search at the police station prior to the incarcera-
tion of an arrestee.65 While a search incident to an arrest is primar-
ily for the safety of the arresting officer, as well as to prevent the
destruction of evidence, 66 the objectives of an inventory search prior
to incarceration are: first, to protect the arrestee's property while
he is in jail; second, to protect the police from false claims; and
third, to prevent the introduction of contraband and weapons into
the jail facility. 67 The facts of both precedents are inapposite to the
facts of Lafayette.
In United States v. Robinson,68 the defendant was validly arrested
for driving while his license was revoked. A search incident to the
arrest revealed a crumpled cigarette package in the pocket of the
defendant's coat which contained drugs. The Court held that the
warrantless search incident to arrest was reasonable, and thus re-
quired no additional justification under the fourth amendment. 69
not have been valid incident to arrest, despite the state's failure to preserve that argu-
ment for appeal. The court stated: "Accordingly, because the shoulder bag was in the
officer's exclusive possession and because no exigent circumstances existed, . . . the
search was not incident to the defendant's arrest." Lafayette, 99 Ill. App. 3d 830, 834,
425 N.E.2d 1383, 1386 (Ct. App. 1981). In his concurring opinion in Illinois v. Lafay-
ette, Justice Marshall, indicated that the search would not have been valid under the
"incident to arrest" exception to the warrant requirement: "A very different case would
be presented if the State had relied solely on the fact of arrest to justify the search of
respondent's shoulder bag. A warrantless search incident to arrest must be justified by
a need to remove weapons or prevent the destruction of evidence." Lafayette, 103 S. Ct.
2605, 2611 (1983) (Marshall, J., concurring).
65. Lafayette, 103 S. Ct. at 2609.
66. United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973).
The right without a search warrant contemporaneously to search persons law-
fully arrested while committing crime and to search the place where the arrest
is made in order to find and seize things connected with the crime as its fruits
or as the means by which it was committed, as well as weapons and other
things to effect an escape from custody, is not to be doubted.
Id. at 225 (quoting Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20 (1925)).
67. LAFAVE, supra note 64; Comment, The Inventory Search, supra note 4. While
this is a primary concern underlying a preincarceration search, it can be accomplished
less intrusively. In Commonwealth v. Wilson, 389 Mass. 115, 448 N.E.2d 1130 (1983),
the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts upheld the search of an arrestee's wallet
prior to his incarceration. This was because a statute required that a record of all
money or other property found in the possession of prisoners be kept. 448 N.E. 2d at
1132. But the court noted "another justification for preincarceration searches is to keep
weapons and contraband from the prison population. This objective, however, does notjustify the inspection of contents of a wallet if the custodian is going to retain it." This
reasoning occurred to the Illinois Appellate Court in People v. Lafayette. In its opinion,
it pointed out that the officer "admitted the defendant's shoulder bag was small enough
to be placed and sealed in a larger bag or box for protective purposes." Lafayette, 99 Ill.
App. 3d at 835, 425 N.E.2d at 1384.
68. 414 U.S. 218 (1973).
69. The Robinson Court stated:
It is the fact of the lawful arrest which established the authority to search, and
9
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In United States v. Edwards,70 the defendant was arrested at
eleven o'clock in the evening for an attempted break in. He was
subsequently incarcerated overnight. Paint chips discovered near a
window which had been pried open prompted police to examine the
defendant's clothes for similar paint chips. The following morning
his clothes were taken from him in order to be examined. The
clothing contained paint chips which were used to incriminate him.
In a five to four decision the Court upheld the warrantless seizure of
the respondent's clothes even though a substantial period of time
had elapsed since the defendant's arrest and the completion of the
administrative booking procedures. 7' It seems interesting that in
Robinson, Justice Marshall's dissenting opinion, which was joined
by Justices Douglas and Brennan, rejected the alternative theory of
sustaining the search of the cigarette package taken from the de-
fendant's shirt as a booking search. In a footnote Justice Marshall
stated:
[t]he justification for stationhouse searches is not the booking
process itself, but rather the fact that the suspect will be placed in
jail. . . . [E]ven had it become necessary to place respondent in
confinement, it is still doubtful whether one could justify opening
up the cigarette package and examining its contents.72
Justice Marshall resolved any doubt as to the justification of
opening a container prior to placing an arrestee in jail in Illinois v.
Lafayette.73 The reason why Justices Marshall and Brennan have
appeared to change their position, might be discovered in their con-
curring opinion in which they indicate that the search of Lafayette's
shoulder bag would not have been sustainable as incident to his
arrest.7
4
The Court's discussion of the Robinson-Edwards line of cases,
which has eviscerated the privacy expectation of one's person due to
his arrest status,75 indicates the Lafayette Court's intention to, in a
similar fashion, eliminate any expectation of privacy in an arrestee's
possessions if he is to be incarcerated. Further indication of this
intent is illustrated by the Court's rejection of the relevancy of
United States v. Chadwick76 and Arkansas v. Sanders,77 which were
we hold that in the case of a lawful custodial arrest a full search of the person
is not only an exception to the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amend-
ment, but it is also a "reasonable" search under the Amendment.
Id. at 235.
70. 415 U.S. 800 (1974).
71. Id. at 808.
72. Robinson, 414 U.S. at 258 n.7 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (quoting United States
v. Mills, 472 F.2d 1231 (1972)).
73. Lafayette, 103 S. Ct. 2605 (1983).
74. Id. at 2611 (Marshall, J., concurring).
75. See supra note 69 and accompanying text.
76. 433 U.S. 1 (1977).
1984]
10
California Western Law Review, Vol. 21 [1984], No. 1, Art. 9
https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwlr/vol21/iss1/9
CALIFORNIA WESTERN LAW REVIEW
relied upon by the Illinois Appellate Court in reaching its
decision. 78
The Court's dictum that the warrant requirement should not ap-
ply in an inventory search context 79 should not be the basis for con-
doning a search which is overly intrusive. As indicated by the court
in United States v. Calandrella, interests sought to be protected in a
pre-incarceration situation can similary be vindicated as soon as the
arrestee relinquishes his property to the police at the station house.
Once the property is in custody, the primary concern of preventing
the introduction of weapons and contraband into jail facility is ef-
fectuated. It is anomalous to require a warrant to search a personal
effect believed to contain contraband, but not require a warrant to
search a personal effect when there is not belief that it contains
contraband.
This contradiction is apparent when considering the absence of
exigencies surrounding the administrative search of an arrestee's
personal effects at a police station. The Lafayette Court's observa-
tion that "it would be unreasonable to expect police officers in the
everyday course of business to make fine and subtle distinctions in
deciding which containers or items may be searched and which
must be sealed as a unit"80 is more applicable to an arrest situation
where an officer must make ad hoc judgments than it is to an ad-
ministrative search which is usually conducted according to set
procedures.
The effect of the decision in Illinois v. Lafayette 8 1 upon those
Federal Courts of Appeal which have previously attempted to bal-
ance the competing interests involved in an inventory search, will be
to eliminate their discretion to protect the individual's privacy from
over-intrusive invasions. Just as the Robinson-Edwards8 2 line of
cases has eliminated an arrestee's expectation of privacy in his per-
son, the decision in Lafayette eliminates an arrestee's expectation of
77. 442 U.S. 753 (1979).
78. People v. Lafayette, 99 Ill. App. 3d 830, 425 N.E.2d 1383 (Ct. App. 1981).
79. Lafayette, 103 S. Ct. at 2608.
80. This particular language in Lafayette was taken from New York v. Belton, 453
U.S. 454 (1981). Belton involved the stop of an automobile by a New York State
Trooper. The trooper, by himself, arrested the four occupants of a car for possession of
a controlled substance. After searching them and positioning them in four separate
areas outside of the car so they were not in reach of each other, he searched the contents
of the car. The trooper, unzipped the pocket of a jacket found in the car and discovered
cocaine inside. Id. at 455-56. The factual situation of Belton would not allow a single
arresting officer to "balance the social and individual interests involved in the specific
circumstance" confronting him. Id. (quoting Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200,
213-14 (1979)). The police station, after an arrestee has been placed in custody and
transported, had no factual exigencies comparable to those in Belton which would re-
quire such a "bright-line" standard, i.e., allowing any container to be opened.
81. 103 S. Ct. at 2605.
82. See supra notes 62-71 and accompanying text.
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privacy in his possessions by virture of his impending incarceration.
After Lafayette, the only requirement will be that an inventory
search is in accordance with established inventory procedures,8 3 re-
gardless of what local agency or individual officer has instituted
them.84 Already, the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit has
interpreted Lafayette to stand for the proposition that "the exist-
ence of less restrictive alternatives to a search are not to be consid-
ered in calculating whether a search which falls into an exception to
the warrant requirement is reasonable.185 This effectively elimi-
nates any fourth amendment protection from over-intrusive admin-
istrative searches in a pre-incarceration situation.
Of interest will be the effect of the holding on established inven-
tory procedures which currently do not allow for the opening of
sealed containers, but which require that they be inventoried as a
unit.8 6 It is reasonable to expect that these procedures will be "re-
standardized" to allow the opening of any sealed container to more
accurately itemize the contents, and better protect the interests in-
volved. The Lafayette Court's blanket authorization of any stan-
dard inventory procedure has opened the door for investigatory
searches, which formerly could not be made without judicial ap-
proval, to be made under the guise of administrative procedure.
While the effect of the decision on federal courts is apparent, the
effect on future state court decisions is not as certain.
III. STATE COURT DECISIONS
A number of state courts have chosen to give greater protection
under their own state constitutions than that afforded by the Fed-
eral Constitution.87 In People v. Bayles,88 a case relied upon by the
83. Lafayette, 103 S. Ct. at 2611.
84. The Court has not addressed the question of who should be responsible for
instituting standard procedures. Apparently the Court is not concerned with the possi-
bility that the procedures may be instituted by a local sheriff. This was the concern of
the Illinois Supreme Court in People v. Bayles, 82 Ill. 2d 128, 411 N.E.2d 1346 (1980),
which was relied on by the Illinois Appellate Court in People v. Lafayette. See infra
notes 88-94 and accompanying text.
85. United States v. Par, 716 F.2d 796, 816 n.21 (8th Cir. 1983). "The Supreme
Court has held that the existence of less restrictive alternatives to a search are not to be
considered in calculating whether a search which falls into an exception to the warrant
requirement is reasonable." Id. (citing Illinois v. Lafayette, 103 S. Ct. at 2610).
86. Currently the Drug Enforcement Agency requires that an arrestee's possessions
be inventoried, but locked or sealed containers be inventoried as units rather than being
opened. Brief for United States Government As Amicus Curiae Supporting Reversal, at
22 n.9, Illinois v. Lafayette, 103 S. Ct. 2605 (1983) [copy on file in the offices of Califor-
nia Western Law Review].
87. In State v. Caraher, 293 Or. 741, 653 P.2d 942, 947 (1982), a search of a wo-
men's purse at the time of her arrest was upheld. The court noted that a state is "free as
a matter of its own law to impose greater restrictions on police activity than those that
the United States Supreme Court holds to be necessary upon federal constitutional stan-
1984]
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Illinois appellate court in deciding People v.. Lafayette,8 9 the
Supreme Court of Illinois refused to uphold the opening of a suit-
case during the inventory search of a car.90 Although it was opened
pursuant to the standard procedures of the local sheriff,9 1 the court
held that the search was violative of the fourth amendment.92 Bal-
ancing the "Opperman objectives" of protecting the defendant's
property and the police from false claims or possible danger, against
the defendants right of privacy, the court found that there was no
concern with safety and that the first two objectives could have been
achieved in a less intrusive manner.93 The Bayles court did not hold
that all warrantless openings of closed containers during the course
of an inventory search are invalid,94 indicating that the competing
interests should be balanced in each case.
The Supreme Court of Hawaii found that a "rule of reason" re-
quired that governmental intrusions into personal privacy could not
be greater than absolutely necessary. In State v. Kaluna95 the court
dards. . . ." Id. The Caraher court also noted that "an increasing number of state
courts are relying on analysis of the search and seizure provisions of their own constitu-
tions to expand constitutional protections beyond those mandated by the Fourth
Amendment, often directly avoiding applicable United States Supreme Court prece-
dent." Id. at 947. In order to avoid review by the Supreme Court it would be necessary
for a state court to make its decision on independent state grounds. See infra notes 120-
21 and accompanying text.
88. 82 Ill. 2d 128, 411 N.E.2d 1346 (1980). In Bayles, the defendant was involved
in a one car accident. When his suitcase was thrown from his car, he asked a witness at
the scene to close his suitcase for him, because he was trapped in his vehicle and unable
to do so himself. The witness closed the latches of the suitcase and rolled the tumblers
on its combination lock. Id. at 132, 411 N.E.2d at 1348.
89. 99 11. App. 3d 830, 834, 425 N.E.2d 1383, 1386 (1981).
90. Id.
91. In Bayles, the county sheriff stated that it was the policy of his office to open
closed, unlocked containers for the purpose of inventorying the items contained in
them. "He stated that he created this policy rule in order to protect both the owner of
the property and the sheriff's office." Bayles, at 134, 411 N.E. 2d at 1348. This raises
the question of who should create "standard inventory procedures." The Illinois
Supreme Court felt that such an intrusion upon an individual's fourth amendment
rights, as in the Bayles case, should not be within the discretion of a local sheriff. It
stands to reason that if a person suspected of having evidence of a crime in one of his
personal effects is entitled to the protection of having a neutral and detached magistrate
determine the constitutionality of searching his belongings, a person who is being
booked, but is not suspected of having contraband in his personal effects, should be
entitled to the same protection.
92. Bayles, 82 11. at 144, 411 N.E.2d at 1353.
93. Id. at 143, 411 N.E.2d at 1353.
94. Id.
95. 55 Hawaii 361, 374, 520 P.2d 51, 61 (1974). In Kaluna, the defendant was
arrested on belief that she had participated in an attempted robbery earlier in the day.
She was not searched by the two male arresting officers at the scene of her arrest, but
was transported directly to the police station. There she was placed in the custody of
the police matron who led her into a bathroom and told her to remove her outer gar-
ments in preparation for a search. After stripping to her underwear, the defendant
reached into the right side of her brazziere and pulled out a piece of tissue paper folded
into a square. The matron opened the packet "just to see what she [defendent] had."
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held that an inventory search did not justify the examination of the
contents of a packet taken from the person of an arrestee prior to
her incarceration. The court chose to give greater protection under
Hawaii's Constitution than that afforded by the Federal Constitu-
tion96 and held the search "unreasonable. 97
Similarly in Reeves v. State,98 the Supreme Court of Alaska held
that the objectives of a pre-incarceration inventory search could be
satisfied without the opening of a sealed container found on the per-
son of an arrestee.99 In Reeves, the defendant was arrested for driv-
ing while intoxicated. During the booking process a pat-down of
his jacket indicated a small object in one of the pockets. The officer
removed the object, which was a tightly wrapped balloon. A search
of the balloon revealed that it contained a narcotic. 00 Noting that
the state Constitution gave broader protection against unreasonable
searches and seizures than the Federal Constitution, the court held
that a pre-incarceration inventory search could not include the
search of items taken from an arrestee's possession, unless a warrant
or other recognized exception to the warrant requirement
applied.' 01
The Supreme Court of Wisconsin refused to uphold the search of
a purse in State v. Prober. 10 2 When a purse taken from a car during
the course of an inventory search was opened, the court found that
The packet contained barbiturates. The defendant was subsequently charged with un-
lawful possession of drugs. Id. at 362-63, 520 P.2d at 54.
96. "We have not hesitated in the past to extend the protections of the Hawaii Bill
of Rights beyond those of textually parallel provisions in the Federal Bill of Rights
when logic and sound regard for the purposes of those protections have so warranted."
Id. at 369, 520 P.2d at 58.
97. Id. at 375, 520 P.2d at 61.
98. 599 P.2d 727 (Alaska 1979).
99. Id. at 736-37. The Reeves court found that two valid justifications for a prein-
carceration search: (1) the preventing of weapons and contraband from entering into a
jail, and (2) the protection of the arrestee's property and the related interest of the
government in protecting itself from false claims, could be protected by placing the
arrestee's property into a property bag and securing it. Id. at 735.
100. Id. at 730.
101. The Reeves court stated:
Finally, the inventory conducted shall consist of a cataloging of the arrestee's
property thus seized and may not, without specific request from the arrestee,
extend to a search and inventory of the contents of any object, closed or sealed
container, luggage, briefcase, or package. We believe that a pre-incarceration
search thus limited both adequately protects the reasonable interests of the
state and appropriately respects an arrestee's reasonable expectation of
privacy.
Id. at 737-38. A few weeks after the decision in Reeves, the Supreme Court of Alaska
also refused to sustain the search of a container, taken from the pocket of an arrestee
during a booking search; holding it beyond the permissible scope of an inventory search.
See, State v. Lyle, 600 P.2d 1357 (Alaska 1980).
102. 98 Wis. 2d 345, 297 N.W.2d 1 (1980).
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the individual's right to privacy outweighed the government's need
to intrude:
In recognizing that there is a greater expectation of privacy in
closed or sealed containers found inside a vehicle than there is in
a vehicle itself, we are balancing the need of the government-
here, those related to inventory searches-against the right of the
people to be free of warrantless intrusions into their personal
effects. 10 3
In People v. Counterman,1°4 the Supreme Court of Colorado re-
fused to uphold the search of the defendant's sealed knapsack, taken
from his car during an inventory of its contents. Stating that "[t]the
owner clearly had an expectation of privacy with regard to his
sealed knapsack which was sufficient to invoke constitutional pro-
tection against unreasonable police intrusion,"'' 05 the court held the
search violative of the fourth amendment and the corresponding
section of the Colorado Constitution. 0 6 Additionally, the court re-
marked that "[t]he legitimate purposes of the inventory search
could have been fully accomplished by merely noting the item as a
sealed knapsack."'' 0 7
In People v. Laiwa,08 the California Supreme Court refused to
sustain the search of the defendant's tote bag after he was arrested
as an accelerated booking search."'' 0 9 In rejecting the justification
that a booking search conducted in the field is no more intrusive
than one conducted at the police station,1'0 the court held that such
searches were impermissible under the warrant requirement of the
California Constitution."' The court pointed out the dangers of an
accelerated booking search by contrasting it with permissible intru-
sions such as a search incident to arrest, and a pat-down in the
event of transportation of the arrestee, which are restricted in their
scope. The court stated:
[a]n accelerated booking search would have no such restrictions.
If such an exception were recognized, police officers would have
103. Id. at 356, 297 N.W.2d at 7.
104. 190 Colo. 152, 556 P.2d 481 (1976).
105. Id. at 154, 556 P.2d at 483.
106. Id. at 158, 556 P.2d at 485.
107. Id.
108. 34 Cal. 3d 711, 669 P.2d 1278, 195 Cal. Rptr. 503 (1983).
109. Id. at 724, 669 P.2d at 1286, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 513.
110. The Laiwa Court expressly overruled People v. Bullwinkle, 105 Cal. App. 3d
87, 164 Cal. Rptr. 163 (1980). In Bullwinkle, the defendant was arrested in her home.
At the time of her arrest, the police took her purse and transported it to the police
station, where it was searched without a warrant. In explaining the theory of a booking
search, the court in Bullwinkle states: "The theory is that the privacy of the prisoner
and her effects would have been invaded anyway, and that therefore no greater intru-
sion on that privacy occurs when the search is conducted other than during the booking
process." Id. at 90, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 168.
111. Laiwa, 34 Cal. 3d at 728, 669 P.2d at 1288, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 513.
Vol. 21
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a license to conduct an immediate "thorough search of the book-
ing type" of the person and effects of any individual they arrest
without a warrant for a minor but bookable offense, in the hope
of discovering evidence of a more serious crime; if such evidence
were found, the suspect would then be booked instead on the
latter charge and the intrusion would be rationalized after the
fact as an "accelerated booking search."' 12
The potential for abuse that would be facilitated by an acceler-
ated booking search is not substantially greater than that which
may occur as a result of allowing the opening of sealed containers in
a pre-incarceration booking search. Many minor offenses can sup-
port an incarceration at the option of the officer-such as driving
without a license.' 13 In the event that the person cannot make bail,
or is merely placed in a holding cell until bail is made, his personal
effects could be searched. This danger was noted by the Hawaiian
Supreme Court in State v. Kaluna.14 That court pointed out that
confidential papers of a lawyer arrested for a traffic offense might
be scrutinized by an officer.' 15
This danger for abusing an actual booking search is not unrealis-
tic. In State v. Garcia 16 the defendant was arrested for criminal
trespass. "Although it was not decided whether Garcia would be
held in jail, he was put through the standard booking process
.. . 7 When the defendant's wallet was searched a small quan-
tity of cocaine was found. Although the police eventually decided
to release Garcia, he was placed in a cell for a short time after the
search. His conviction for possession of cocaine was affirmed by
the Oregon Supreme Court.' 18
Since the primary justification of a pre-incarceration search is to
prevent weapons or contraband from entering a jail facility, even
the search of a closed container prior to a temporary incarceration
would be permissible under Lafayette. Consequently, any person
112. Id. at 727, 669 P.2d at 1288, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 513. The court also noted:
"Because this case does not involve a true booking search, we have no occasion to deter-
mine the ultimate limits of such a search." Laiwa, 34 Cal. 3d at 727 n.9, 669 P.2d at
1288 n.9, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 513 n.9. The court cited Reeves v. State, 599 P.2d 727
(Alaska 1979) and State v. Kaluna, 55 Hawaii 361, 520 P.2d 51 (1974), as states which
had determined the limits of a booking search. This might indicate the attitude of the
California Supreme Court, however, when the issue is squarely presented, the California
Supreme Court may find itself prevented from giving that same protection, by Proposi-
tion 8, which allows California courts to give only that protection afforded by the fed-
eral Constitution.
113. In Lafayette, the defendant was arrested for disturbing the peace. In United
States v. Robinson, the defendant was arrested for driving while his license was expired.
114. 55 Hawaii 361, 520 P.2d 51 (1974).
115. Id. at 368 n.5, 520 P.2d at 58 n.5 (1974).
116. 35 Wash. App. 174, 665 P.2d 1381 (1983).
117. Id. at 175, 665 P.2d at 1382.
118. Id. at 177, 665 P.2d at 1383.
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arrested and taken to a police station may be subject to a search of
his personal effects, no matter how brief his incarceration may be.
A number of state courts have relied on their own constitutions
to give greater protection than that afforded by the fourth amend-
ment. 19 However, even those courts will need to protect their deci-
sions from review by the Supreme Court should they wish to
continue to give increased protection. As noted by the Supreme
Court in Michigan v. Long,120 "If the state court decision indicates
clearly and expressly that it is alternatively based on bona fide sepa-
rate, adequate, and independent state grounds, this Court will not
undertake to review the decision."' 21 Whether those states which
have afforded greater protection to an individual's right of privacy
in an inventory search context will continue to do so in light of
Illinois v. Lafayette is questionable.
IV. ALTERNATIVES
One alternative to allowing individual police agencies to establish
their own standard inventory procedures would be for the legisla-
ture to prescribe guidelines for inventory searches. This would al-
low for a balancing of the competing interests by an elected body
that is not responsible for the investigation of criminal acts, and
would be more inclined to be objective.
Another alternative would be to allow an arrestee to place his
belongings in a locker, which has already been suggested by a fed-
eral district court. 122 An arrestee's possessions could be screened
for explosives by dogs or airport-type x-ray machines, and subse-
119. See supra notes 87-118 and accompanying text.
120. 103 S. Ct. 3469 (1983).
121. Id. at 3476.
122. In United States v. Mills, 472 F.2d 1231 (D.C. Cir. 1972), the defendant was
arrested for a petty offense. The arresting officer did not advise him of the opportunity
to post $50 bond and leave the precinct, rather than be incarcerated. The defendant was
told to empty his pockets and drugs were found among the contents. The court held
that the search was unreasonable, as it violated the guarantees of the fourth amend-
ment. The defendant's conviction was reversed. Id. at 1233, 1241. The court did not
"grapple with the difficult questions of permissible occasion and extent of inventory
searches," but noted:
When a petty offense is of a collateral nature, a question arises whether an
offender without means (a) can be detained on account of such violation-or
whether such detention enforces a discrimination on the basis of wealth; and
(b) assuming he can be detained, whether a person arrested for such a petty
offense can be subject to a thorough search, or whether a less extreme intru-
sion on privacy does not mark the limits of reasonableness, as by giving him
an opportunity, like that accorded someone given a bathhouse locker for tem-
porary use, to "check" his belongings in a sealed envelope, perhaps upon exe-
cuting a waiver releasing the officer of any responsibility.
Id. at 1239 n.1l.
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quently placed in a steel locker and locked by the arrestee himself
who would retain the key.
A final alternative would be to exclude the use of any evidence of
a crime found in the belongings of an arrestee as the result of an
inventory search which was conducted for the noninvestigatory
purpose of safeguarding his property. This is extremely unlikely,
however, in light of the Court's discontent with the Exclusionary
Rule.
CONCLUSION
The decision in Illinois v. Lafayette 23 is unusual because it is an
unanimous decision in an area of the law which has been permeated
by numerous close decisions; the majority of which have been de-
cided by a margin of five to four. Ironically, in South Dakota v.
Opperman,124 a five to four decision primarily relied upon by the
Lafayette Court, Justice Powell stated: "The absence of a warrant
will not impair the effectiveness of a post-search review of the rea-
sonableness of a particular inventory search."' 125 Yet the decision in
Illinois v. Lafayette has effectively removed from review, any inven-
tory search which purports to conform with existing standard pro-
cedures. Consequently, law enforcement agencies which institute
procedures will effectively decide what is constitutionally reason-
able, thus eliminating an important fourth amendment protection.
While future decisions in the federal courts will be bound, state
court decisions which seek to give greater protection under their
own constitutions must be insulated from review by the Supreme
Court.126 The amount of protection afforded an arrestee may turn
on whether he is arrested by state or federal officers or even which
state he is arrested in. The Lafayette decision has further eroded
the already-waning individual's right to privacy in his personal
effects.
Philip Popper
123. Lafayette, 103 S. Ct. 2605 (1983).
124. 428 U.S. 364 (1976).
125. Id. at 383 (Powell, J., concurring).
126. See supra notes 120-21 and accompanying text.
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